Our Government & their wacky conspiracy theories…

Don’t believe the charges until you’ve read the charge sheet

By Rolf Lindgren and Dr. Kevin Barrett
December 9, 2009

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and five co-defendants have been charged with conspiracy and related charges.  Their trial, recently announced by president Barack Obama, will be held in federal court next year in New York.  KSM has been labeled the “mastermind” behind the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and Obama has already declared him guilty.  This article will analyze those conspiracy charges.

Conspiracy charges are very common in federal court, especially in the racist war on drugs, because it is easier to obtain convictions by positing a “conspiracy” than by proving defendants guilty of an actual crime.  Now the federal government is using conspiracy charges in the racist war on terror.

Charging someone with “conspiracy” amounts to accusing that person of thoughtcrime. If a person imagines committing a crime, and discusses their thoughts with a second person who then mentions it to a third, all three people are vulnerable to conspiracy charges. This may be the case even when the first person is a government agent! A classic example is the case of the Liberty City 7, a hapless group of impoverished pot-smokers who, after being handed $50,000 by two undercover FBI agents, obligingly fantasized about blowing up the Sears Tower. In addition to indulging in pot-fueled verbal fantasies, these defendants supposedly committed one “overt act”: they bought boots. The feds had to stage three show trials before they finally got a conviction, making a mockery of the Constitution’s guarantee, “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The case of the Liberty City 7, and countless similar conspiracy cases in the federal courts, suggest that the world’s leading wild-eyed conspiracy theorists are federal prosecutors.

The charge sheet against KSM and his co-defendants lists alleged overt acts, numbered 1 to 169, which the government claims furthered the 9/11 conspiracy.  For the government to win the case, they need to convince the jury that each defendant committed at least one overt act that furthered the alleged conspiracy. A quick perusal of the charge sheet, however, shows no evident connection between the vast majority of these overt acts and any alleged conspiracy to commit mass murder.

But to be cleared of all 169 overt acts, the defendants’ best strategy may be to force the government to prove that the posited “Osama and 19 hijackers” conspiracy actually took place. Hundreds of expert witnesses (many listed here) are available to prove that it did not. Evidence that the 19 alleged hijackers were framed, discussed in Jay Kolar’s scholarly article “What We Now Know About the Alleged 9/11 Hijackers” and in the works of David Ray Griffin, suggests that the current defendants may also have been framed. Intelligence agencies and associated criminal networks routinely frame patsies to take the blame for terrorist acts, assassinations, and similar crimes (Webster Tarpley, 9/11 Synthetic Terror).

The list of 169 alleged overt acts attempts to paint a negative picture of each defendant.  No mention is made of any positive attributes.  The list does not mention their occupations, marital status, whether they have children or family, hobbies, or what schools they attended. By leaving these items out, the government makes it easier to picture these accused men committing a heinous crime.

We have analyzed the specific overt acts attributed to KSM and his five co-defendants in great detail.  The government has taken a few people who may have known some of the alleged 9/11 hijackers and/or had a business or personal relationship with a few of them, and constructed a giant conspiracy theory.

KSM and the other men on trial are scapegoats, like the victims of Stalin’s show trials and the Inquisition’s witch trials.  Apparently the most important evidence will come from alleged confessions extracted from men tortured and held for years in solitary confinement at the Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo) prison. It is critically important that the defense should point out, over and over, that the torture techniques applied to these defendants were developed specifically to elict false confessions, and that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has clearly stated that he “made up stories,” i.e. gave false confessions under torture.

The Charge Sheet begins by listing the alleged aliases of the six accused men.

http://home.comcast.net/%7Egold9472/d20080211chargesheet.pdf

While reading this, please think like the jury and presume the defendants innocent.  All defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In conspiracy trials, the government counts on finding jurors who will presume the defendants are guilty because they would not be on trial unless they did something wrong. That kind of thinking wins a lot of false convictions for the government in federal court.

From page one of the charge sheet:

“ALIASES OF ACCUSED:

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (aliases Mukhtar al Baluchi; Hafiz; Meer Akram; Abdul Rahman Abdullah Al Ghamdi)

Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin ‘Attash (aliases Khallad; Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf; Silver; Tawfiq)

Ramzi Binalshibh (aliases Abu Ubaydah; Ahad Abdollahi Sabet; Abu Ubaydah al Hadrami)

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aliases Ammar al Baluchi; Isam Mansur; Isam Mansar; Isam Mansour; Ali; Hani.)

Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi (aliases Zahir; HaShem Abdollahi; Muhammad Ahanad; Abderahman Mustafa)

Mohamed al Kahtani (aliases Ahmed al Qahtani; Mohamed al Qahtani; Abdul Rahman al Janoobi)”

Conspicuous by his absence from the list of defendants is Osama bin Laden, who has never been charged in connection with 9/11 because, the FBI states, there is “no hard evidence” against him. If the list of overt acts were true, there would be plenty of hard evidence against him. This suggests that the charges against the six defendants cannot be true.

Please note that the charge sheet uses the conspiratorial term “aliases”, instead of the more sensible term “nicknames”, or simply “name variants”.  Most people have all sorts of forms of names they use; first name only, last name only, middle name, middle initial, hyphenated names, titles, nicknames, etc.  In addition, names translated from Arabic can have alternate spellings in English.  Also, in Arabic, extra middle names, and extra family names are more commonly used than in English.

The government needs to prove these are really aliases, and not just nicknames, innocent name variants, or different people with the same or similar sounding names.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Show us the evidence!

[In this section, the government’s charges appear in Arial typeface, while our comments on each alleged overt act will appear in brackets.]

Alleged Overt Acts Which Do Not Involve Defendants

  • [69 alleged overt acts. We have rearranged the alleged overt acts into groups.  Each defendant must be individually judged to be innocent or guilty; so all the alleged overt acts against each defendant have been grouped together.  The initial 69 alleged overt acts do not mention the defendants, so we will get them out of the way first.  Even if all of the initial alleged acts were true, they would not show that KSM and his co-defendants committed any crime.]

1. In August 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a public “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans,” in which he called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian Peninsula.

  • [Osama bin Laden aka Usama bin Laden aka Tim Osman the CIA asset is not a defendant in this trial, nor has he been indicted in connection with the 9/11 attacks because, the FBI states, there is “no hard evidence” against him.  The 9/11 terrorist strikes were not on the Arabian Peninsula.  The date the Declaration is given is not specified.  This alleged overt act is not in any way relevant and seems to have been placed first on the list for media consumption.]

4. In February 1998, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and others, under the banner of “International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders,” issued a fatwa (purported religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans – whether civilian or military – anywhere they can be found and to “plunder their money.”

  • [No evidence is provided that bin Laden or Zawariri can “require” any of the co-defendants to do anything.  Bin Laden and Zawariri are not defendants on trial.  The item does not specify if “Americans” includes South Americans, Central Americans, or North Americans from Canada and Mexico.  The 9/11 attacks killed people from many nations, not just Americans.  The item itself says it is “purported”, not proven.  Any Muslim may issue fatwas because there is no clergy in Islam. Clearly this alleged fatwa has little relevance, since if even a small fraction of the world’s one billion Muslims started attacking all Americans, then many millions of Americans would be killed, robbed, or abducted each year.  The item is incoherent as to how American Muslims should act or how non-American Muslims should treat them.  This alleged overt act makes no sense and is not relevant.]

5. On or about May 29, 1998, Usama bin Laden issued a statement entitled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” under the banner of the “International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders,” in which he stated that “it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.”

  • [Again, bin Laden is not on trial.  Most people killed on 9/11 were not Jews, the Crusades ended over 700 years ago, and the term “enemies of God” is vague and undefined.  This alleged overt act is not relevant.]

8. On or about April 3, 1999, and April 7, 1999, respectively, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) received visas in Jeddah, Saudia Arabia, in order to travel to the United States.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.  It might be suspicious to the conspiratorial minded fringe, but presumably, those who are conspiratorial will be stricken from the jury pool.  Hazmi and al Mihdhar have not even entered the alleged conspiracy yet, as this is their first mention, making this alleged overt act even more totally irrelevant.  The specificity of the dates mentioned does indicate that the government may have solid evidence that these legal actions did occur when alleged.]

31. On or about March 22, 2000, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) sent an email from Germany to several flight schools in the United States stating, “we are a small group (2-3) of joung [sic] men from different arab countries… We would like to start training for the career of airline professional pilots.”

  • [This is great evidence for the defense if there is a paper trail, which seems to be the case.  It shows that Atta and probably Binalshibh want to be career professional pilots, not martyrs.  What was Atta’s email address, by the way?  According to one report, it was mohammedatta@hotmail.com. Where are the rest of Atta’s emails and what do they say?  Why did Atta use a variant spelling of his name on his own email address?  If Atta was in a secret sleeper cell, why not use a less obvious email?  Did the government release all of Atta’s email to the defense on discovery?  The government has a propensity to frame defendants by withholding exculpatory evidence during discovery.]

32. On or about March 26, 2000, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) submitted an application to the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) in Venice, Florida, and later enrolled.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving a co-defendant.  One reason the government likes conspiracy charges, is so they can claim that legal behavior is illegal.  But the burden of proof is on the government; they must PROVE that the legal actions mentioned in the charge sheet are somehow illegal.]

37. On or about May 18, 2000, in Berlin, Germany, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) received a visa to travel to the United States.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.]

38. On or about May 25, 2000, in Berlin, Germany, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) received a visa to travel to the United States.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.  Jarrah’s email address was reportedly ziadjarrah@ab.com, so this is evidence that Jarrah was not trying to hide his identity and was not a member of a secret sleeper cell.  Source: http://www.911blogger.com/node/9654]

39. On or about May 29, 2000, Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) traveled from Brussels, Belgium, to Newark, New Jersey.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not even involving a co-defendant.]

40. On or about June 3, 2000, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) traveled from Prague, Czech Republic, to Newark, New Jersey.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.]

44. On or about June 27, 2000, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) traveled from Munich, Germany, to Atlanta, Georgia.

  • [There are media reports that that cite evidence of more than one Ziad Jarrah (source: scholar Jay Kolar).  The defense should be allowed to call relevant scholars, reporters, and/or sources as witnesses.  The government must prove which Ziad Jarrah they are talking about each time he is mentioned in this charge sheet.]

46. On or about July 7, 2000, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) and Marwan Al-Shehhi (UA #175) opened a joint checking account at SunTrust Bank in Venice, Florida, with a $7,000 cash deposit.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.  Billions of people around the world have checking accounts.]

48. Between, in, or about July 2000 and in or about December 2000, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) and Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) attended flight training classes at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior on the part of Atta and Shehhi; it is the owners of Huffman Aviation, with their alleged involvement in intelligence operations and drug smuggling, who are suspicious (source: Daniel Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland).  One wonders why the alleged hijackers could not train to fly planes in the Middle East, rather than at an apparently bogus “flight school” serving as a front for one or more Western intelligence agencies.]

60. On or about November 5, 2000, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) ordered flight deck videos for the Boeing 747 Model 200 and the Boeing 757 Model 200, as well as other items from Sporty’s Pilot Shop in Batavia, Ohio.

  • [To conspiratorial thinkers, Sporty’s Pilot Shop in Batavia, Ohio, could be involved in a conspiracy.  But according to item # 31 above, Atta was interested in becoming a professional airline pilot.  If true, this explains why he allegedly ordered Boeing 757 and Boeing 747 videos.]

62. On December 2, 2000, Hani Hanjour (AA #77) traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving a co-defendant.]

65. On or about December 8, 2000, Hani Hanjour (AA #77) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to San Diego, California.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.]

67. On or about December 11, 2000, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) ordered flight deck videos for the Boeing 767 Model 300ER and the Airbus A320-200 from Sporty’s Pilot Shop in Batavia, Ohio.

  • [Ordered just in time for Christmas, so it could be evidence that Atta is a Christian. Hopsicker cites witnesses, including Atta’s girlfriend Amanda Keller, that Atta’s behavior was at the opposite extreme from that of a practicing Muslim, much less a fanatic. According to Keller, Atta’s favorite food was pork chops. See Hopsicker’s video The Secret World of Mohamed Atta. Amanda Keller should be called as a witness.]

71. In or about March 2001, having already earned his pilot’s license in 1999, Hani Hanjour (AA #77) attended flight simulator training in Phoenix, Arizona, at Pan Am International Flight Academy, Jet Tech International.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving a co-defendant.]

72. On or about January 30, 2001, Hani Hanjour (AA #77) paid the balance of his simulator training with a Bank of America cashier’s check in the amount of $5,745.00.

  • [In other words, he did not pay in cash; the cops always find it suspicious when you pay in cash.  Is Bank of America in on the conspiracy?]

73. Between on or about January 31, 2001, and on or about February 6, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) and Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) took “flight check” rides around Decatur, Georgia.

  • [“Flight check” rides is in quotes.  Hmmm?  What’s that?  Might be suspicious to the conspiratorial minded investigator.]

74. On or about March 19, 2001, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) ordered flight deck videos for the Boeing 747 Model 400, the Boeing 747 Model 200, and the Boeing 777 Model 200, and another video from Sporty’s Pilot Shop in Batavia, Ohio.

  • [There it is again, Sporty’s Pilot Shop.  Could three times mentioned be just a coincidence?]

81. On or about April 23, 2001, Satam al Suqami (AA #11) and Waleed al Shehri (AA #11) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, via Emirates Flight #7 to London-Gatwick, England, and Virgin Atlantic Flight #27 from London to Orlando, Florida.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.  Waleed al Shehri, like nine other alleged hijackers according to Kolar, was credibly reported alive after 9/11, so the relevant reporters and/or sources should be tracked down and/or brought in as witnesses.]

82. On or about May 1, 2001, Satam al Suqami (AA #11) and Waleed al Shehri (AA #11) opened a joint bank account at SunTrust Bank in Florida with a cash deposit of $9,000.

  • [This is alleged cash deposit is below the $10,000 mark that the government considers to be suspicious.  Since only one deposit is made, the deposit is not “structured” to avoid reporting requirements.  To zealous prosecutors, making an un-suspicious cash deposit is suspicious.]

83. On or about May 2, 2001, Ahmad al Ghamdi (UA #175) and Majed Moqed (AA# 77) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, via Emirates Flight #1 to London-Heathrow, England, and United Airlines Flight #925 from London to Washington-Dulles, Virginia.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.]

84. Beginning in or about May 2001, while in Florida, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) joined a gym and took martial arts lessons which included instruction in knife fighting.

  • [This is legal, non-suspicious behavior, and self-defense is a natural right.  Since the name of the gym is not mentioned, that suggests the evidence for this claim is weak or non-existent.  Witness misidentification is one of the leading causes of false conviction in the United States.  If this claim is based on an eyewitness, it makes for unreliable evidence, especially since the event occurred so far in advance of 9/11.  The government may have intentionally put in this item in an attempt to bias the jury.  The trial will be held in a large city where weapons regulations are more popular than in rural areas.]

86. On or about May 28, 2001, Ahmed al Nami (UA # 93), Hamza al Ghamdi (UA #175), and Mohand al Shehri (UA #175) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, via Emirates Flight #7 to London-Gatwick, England, and Virginia Atlantic Flight #5 from London to Miami, Florida.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.  Al Nami was reported alive after 9/11 (Kolar), so the relevant reporters and their sources should tracked down and/or brought in as witnesses.]

87. On or about June 1, 2001, Ahmed al Nami (UA # 93), Mohand al Shehri (UA #175), and Hamza al Ghamdi opened bank accounts at SunTrust Bank in Florida with cash deposits of $4,700, $4,800, and $3,000, respectively.

  • [This is legal, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.  The cash deposits are below $10,000 and are not “structured”.]

89. On or about June 8, 2001, Wail al Shehri (AA #11) and Ahmed al Haznawi (UA #93) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates on Emirates Flight #7, via London-Gatwick, England, and Virgin Atlantic Flight #5 from London to Miami, Florida.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.]

90. On or about June 18, 2001, Wail al Shehri (AA #11) opened a bank account at SunTrust Bank in Florida with a deposit of $8,000.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.]

96. On or about June 27, 2001, Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) and Saeed al Ghamdi (UA #93) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on Emirates Flight #7 via London-Gatwick, England, and Virgin Atlantic Flight #15 from London to Orlando, Florida.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.]

101. On or about June 29, 2001, Salem al Hazmi (AA #77) and Abdul Aziz al Omari (AA #11) traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to New York, New York, via Zurich, Switzerland.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.  Omari was reported alive after 9/11 (Kolar), so the relevant reporters and sources should be tracked down and/or brought in as witnesses.]

102. On or about July 4, 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) traveled to New York, New York, from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.]

103. On or about July 8, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) purchased two Victorinox Swiss Army pocket knives in Zurich, Switzerland.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.  The only suspicious thing about this overt act is that “Victorinox” resembles the pseudonym of an apparent provocateur who posts at the discredited website truthaction.org]

104. On or about July 9, 2001, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77), Majed Moqed (AA #77) and Ahmed al Ghamdi (UA #175) opened bank accounts at the Dime Savings Bank in New Jersey.

  • [This item does not specify the amount of money or type of deposit used to open the account, indicating the government may lack solid evidence of this alleged overt act.]

105. On or about July 12, 2001, Ahmad al Haznawi (UA #93) opened a bank account at SunTrust Bank in Florida with a deposit of $500.

  • [Wow!  Really?  $500?  You don’t say!  That is one heck of an alleged overt act.]

106. On or about July 12, 2001, Saeed al Ghamdi (UA #93) opened a bank account at SunTrust Bank in Florida with a deposit of $4,500.

  • [The type of deposit is not specified, indicating a possibly weak evidence for an alleged overt act.]

108. On or about July 18, 2001, Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) opened an account at SunTrust Bank in Florida with a deposit of $1,000.

  • [Yawn.]

109. On or about July 18, 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) opened a bank account at Hudson United Bank in New Jersey with a $300 deposit.

  • [ Hold the phone!  Now we got a $300 deposit!  Was it in cash?]

114. On or about August 1, 2001, in Florida, Fayez Banihammad’s (UA #175) Standard Chartered Bank VISA card was used for the first time in the United States to withdraw approximately $2,804.50.

  • [Ok, you got me.  $2804.05 is a little more than most people pull out of an ATM.  Did he pull the money for the strip club or the gambling boat?  We can’t cross-examine him, because he is dead. Right?]

115. On or about July 21, 2001, Salem al Hazmi (AA #77) opened a bank account at Hudson United Bank in New Jersey with a $500 deposit.

  • [Okay, we’re convinced that these guys had bank accounts. Many people do.]

116. On or about July 26, 2001, Abdul Aziz al Omari (AA #11) opened a bank account at Hudson United Bank in New Jersey with a $100 deposit.

  • [OK, that’s it!  $100 and probably in cash!  That does it!  This section of the charge sheet is officially declared a dreadful farce.]

117. On or about August 4, 2001, at approximately 4:18 p.m., a vehicle rented by Mohamed Atta (AA #11) entered a parking garage at Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida.

  • [None of the alleged 9/11 terrorist flights took off from Florida, so what the hell is this doing here? Using parking garages, like having bank accounts, is not a federal offense.]

123. On or about August 4, 2001, at approximately 9:04 p.m., the vehicle rented by Mohamed Atta (AA #11) departed the parking garage at Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida.

  • [Another non-heinous and irrelevant alleged overt act, not involving a co-defendant.  It doesn’t even say if Atta drove the vehicle.]

124. On August 13, 2001, Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) purchased two knives from Sports Authority, Boynton Beach, Florida.

  • [This is legal, non-suspicious behavior, not involving any co-defendants.  Everyone has the natural right to bear arms.  To the conspiratorial minded, Sports Authority, Boynton Beach, Florida could be in on a conspiracy.  To prove this minor alleged transaction, a paper trail would help.  But if the government had a paper trail, they would probably have specified whether he paid in cash or used his SunTrust Bank debit card, or another means of payment.  It is possible that this was a case of mistaken identity.]

125. On August 13, 2001, Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) purchased a Stanley two piece knife snap set from Wal-Mart, Boynton Beach, Florida.

  • [Did he buy it in cash, charge it on his SunTrust Bank debit card, or use his Standard Chartered Bank VISA card?  Is Wal-Mart in on the conspiracy?  If the government doesn’t know, it’s doubtful they have proof that this transaction took place. And even if they do, so what?]

126. On or about August 17, 2001, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) took a “check ride” at a flight school in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

  • [Which Ziad Jarrah (see Kolar)? What is a “check ride”?  Does it have anything to do with his wedding that was reportedly scheduled for September 25, 2001?  Why couldn’t the alleged hijackers learn to fly planes in the Middle East, where they would not attract attention?]

127. On or about August 22, 2001, Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) used his VISA card in Florida to obtain approximately $4,800.00 cash, which was previously deposited into his Standard Chartered Bank account in the United Arab Emirates.

  • [The reason the government is listing all these alleged cash transitions is to attempt to lay blame on the alleged money sources.  The government is going to claim that money that was allegedly supplied to the alleged hijackers was used to forward a conspiracy.  But remember, money is a fungible commodity.  Example:  Suppose I have $100 in my bank account, and a terrorist moneyman sends me another $100 that I put into my same account.  Then, later, I take $100 out of my account and use it to commit a crime.  Question:  Is the $100 I used for the crime from the moneyman, or is it the money I already had?  In other words, the jury is entitled to know ALL of the alleged money transactions from each bank account mentioned in this charge sheet, so they can sort out the real sources of the money.  All the government has done here is cherry-pick certain transactions to make the defendants look vaguely guilty.]

130. On or about August 25, 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) and Majed Moqed (AA #77) reserved tickets for American Airlines Flight 77, scheduled to depart Washington Dulles International Airport, Dulles, Virginia, at 8:10 a.m. and arrive at Los Angeles, California, on September 11, 2001.

  • [The government needs to have good evidence for this, or their case will start to fall apart.  It does not say if a specific credit card was used to make the reservation, making it problematic that the evidence is strong for this alleged overt act.]

131. On or about August 26, 2001, tickets were reserved for Waleed al Shehri (AA #11) and Wail al Shehri (AA #11) on American Airlines Flight 11, scheduled to depart Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, at 7:45 a.m. and arrive at Los Angeles, California, on September 11, 2001.

  • [Please note the switch from the previous item; in this item the tickets “were reserved”, it says.  Well, who reserved them and how were they reserved?  Is there actual evidence they were reserved at all?  Did Waleed and Wail know they were reserved?  The defense needs to find out.]

132. On or about August 27, 2001, tickets were reserved for Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) and Mohand al Shehri (UA #175), on United Airlines Flight 175, scheduled to depart Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, at 8:00 a.m. and arrive at Los Angeles, California, on September 11, 2001.

  • [Again the government uses the passive voice: the tickets “were reserved.”  If one or more of the defendants on trial reserved the tickets, the government would say so.]

133. On or about August 27, 2001, tickets were reserved for Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Salem al Hazmi (AA #77) on American Airlines Flight 77 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [Once again, we are told the tickets “were reserved.”  The identity of who really reserved the tickets could be exculpatory evidence for the six defendants.]

134. On or about August 27, 2001, tickets were reserved for Saeed al Ghamdi (UA #93) and Ahmed al Nami (UA #93) on United Airlines Flight 93, scheduled to depart from Newark International Airport, Newark, New Jersey, at 8:00 a.m. and arrive at San Francisco, California, on September 11, 2001.

  • [And yet again, it says the tickets “were reserved”.  The real conspirators behind 9/11 may have reserved the tickets.  According to news reports citing primary documents, al Ghambi was not on UA #93 on 9/11, but was booked onto a different flight that day.  Al Ghambi was also booked for other flights after 9/11, indicating he was not a martyr.  The defense should be able to present these primary documents as evidence.]

135. On or about August 27, 2001, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) purchased a Leatherman Wave Multi-tool from a Target department store in Laurel, Maryland.

  • [Oh, no!  Not the Wave Multi-tool from Target!  How did Hazmi allegedly pay for it?  Is there a paper trail?  Could the witness have been mistaken?  Is Target in on the conspiracy?]

136. On or about August 22, 2001, and August 27, 2001, in Miami, Florida, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) purchased a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) device, other GPS-related equipment, and schematics for Boeing 757 cockpit instrument diagrams.

  • [The government has already claimed that Jarrah took flying lessons.  There is absolutely nothing suspicious about a pilot buying a GPS device.  The Boeing 757 cockpit instrument schematics could be considered mildly suspicious if we knew more about Jarrah.  Perhaps Jarrah planned to apply for a job as an airplane pilot?  In any event, the alleged overt act is vague.  It does not say where he purchased the items or how he paid for them, indicating there is no paper trail.  The alleged evidence may derive from statements made by someone under the pain of torture.]

137. On or about August 28, 2001, tickets were reserved for Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Abdul Aziz al Omari (AA #11), and Satam al Suqami (AA#11) on American Airlines Flight 11 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [Yet another faulty passive-voice sentence: the tickets “were reserved”.  Who reserved them? If Atta, Omari, and Suqami don’t know the tickets were reserved, then this alleged overt act means absolutely nothing.  The government is not claiming they do know, so it is more likely that this item is merely fodder for the media.]

138. On or about August 28, 2001, tickets were reserved for Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) on United Airlines Flight 175 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [The tickets “were reserved”.  It seems that the government only has evidence that two of the 19 alleged hijackers actually bought or knew about their plane tickets.  This is a huge weakness in the government’s conspiracy theory.]

140. On or about August 29, 2001, tickets were reserved for Ahmed al Ghamdi (UA #175) and Hamza al Ghamdi (UA #175) on United Airlines Flight 175 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [Repeat, are we done yet?]

141. On or about August 29, 2001, tickets were reserved for Ahmed al Haznawi (UA #93) on United Airlines Flight 93 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [Not quite, but at least the government has more alleged overt acts.]

142. On or about August 30, 2001, tickets were reserved for Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) on United Airlines Flight 93 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [Jarrah was reportedly a well-educated man.  Is it not strange that he could not order his own plane tickets, and that the government could not write active-voice English sentences? In any case, NONE of the six defendants is alleged to have purchased any of the plane tickets used by the alleged 9/11 hijackers!]

143. On or about August 30, 2001, Hamza al Ghamdi (UA #175) purchased a Leatherman Wave Multi-Tool from Lowe’s Home Improvement, Boynton Beach, Florida.

  • [The Wave Multi-Tool from Lowe’s and not from Target?  What is the evidence for this?]

144. On or about August 31, 2001, tickets were reserved for Hani Hanjour (AA #77) on American Airlines Flight 77 for travel on September 11, 2001.

  • [Yet another strange passive-voice sentence. But at least with Hanjour, it has been reported that his English was very poor, so maybe he had trouble ordering things on the Internet or making calls, or however the tickets were allegedly reserved.  Were they paid for as well, or just reserved? And if Hanjour’s English and flying skills were both atrocious, how did he get a US pilot’s license, much less perform advanced acrobatics in a 757? Whoever granted his license, along with the witnesses who have given contradictory testimony about his flying skills (all sources except one, Israeli flight instructor Eddie Shalev, say they were terrible) should be called to testify.]

158. On or about September 11, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) possessed a handwritten set of final instructions for a martyrdom operation on an airplane using knives, copies of which were also found at the crash site of United Airlines Flight 93 and in Nawaf al Hazmi’s (AA #77) Toyota Corolla at Washington Dulles International Airport.

  • [This is one of the most important claims in the entire government case.  If they can’t prove this one, they don’t have much of a case.  There are several reasons not to believe it, especially if Atta’s “handwritten set of final instructions” is the same five-page document that leading Middle East expert Robert Fisk, and every Muslim with whom he has discussed the matter, agree could not possibly have been written by an actual Muslim?]
  • [The charge does not say in whose handwriting the final instructions are written in.  If they are not in Atta’s handwriting, then whose?  It does not say it was in Atta’s handwriting, so it is likely that it is not.  Do the instructions really have final instructions for martyrdom, or is that government speculation and conjecture?  Are the alleged sets of instructions in the same handwriting or different?  Are any notes in al Hazmi’s handwriting, or in the handwriting of any alleged hijacker on FL93?  Our guess is no, otherwise the government would say it.  Two; video evidence from the site of the alleged crash of FL93 does not show a plane, so how did the alleged handwritten instructions get there?  Will the judge allow the jury to see the video from the alleged crash site?  Will the defense ask to have it presented?  Who found the instructions, and what is the chain of custody?]

159. On September 11, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) and Abdul Aziz al Omari (AA #11) flew from Portland, Maine, to Boston, Massachusetts.

  • [Dr. David Ray Griffin has shown in his book 9/11 Contradiction (Part III, chapter 16, pages 157 to 169), that there are extensive problems with this claim and many reasons why it may not be true.  The defense should be entitled to call any or all witnesses cited by Griffin either directly or indirectly regarding this claimed alleged overt act.  The defense should also be entitled to call Dr. Griffin as an expert witness.]

160. On or about September 11, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) possessed an operating manual for a Boeing 757/767 Simulator, pepper spray, a knife, and a German travel visa.

  • [This is an interesting claim, because if the pepper spray and knife was found in Atta’s un-transferred luggage, then it was never intended to be in the passenger area of the plane the government claims that Atta hijacked. Why would Atta put his weapons in checked baggage? For that matter, why would he put his will in the checked baggage of a plane he was planning to crash into the World Trade Center? The many contradictions and absurdities in the government’s claims about the alleged Atta evidence are deconstructed in David Ray Griffin’s “9/11 Contradictions: Mohamed Atta’s Mitsubishi and His Luggage.”]
  • [The next four alleged overt acts jump from tickets that “were reserved”, to suicide hijackers.  There is a giant gap in the government’s conspiracy theory.  There is no overt act that states that the alleged hijackers knew they had tickets reserved, paid for the tickets, picked up the tickets, went to the airport, or boarded the planes.  When the government has a giant gap in a conspiracy theory that usually means they have no evidence for their claims.]

161. On September 11, 2001, Mohamed Atta, Abdul Aziz al Omari, Satam al Suqami, Waleed al Shehri, and Wail al Shehri hijacked American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, which had departed from Boston, Massachusetts, at approximately 7:59 a.m. They crashed Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan at approximately 8:46 a.m., causing the collapse of the tower and the deaths of 87 passengers and crew members on board, and thousands of persons in and around the World Trade Center. (See Charge Sheet Appendix A for list of individuals killed on Flight 11 and at the site of the World Trade Center).

162. On September 11, 2001, Marwan al Shehhi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, and Ahmed al Ghamdi, hijacked United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767, which had departed from Boston, Massachusetts, at approximately 8:14 a.m. They crashed Flight 175 into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan at approximately 9:03 a.m., causing the collapse of the tower and the deaths of 60 passengers and crew members on board, and thousands of persons in and around the World Trade Center. (See Charge Sheet Appendix A for list of individuals killed on Flight 175 and at the site of the World Trade Center).

  • [The government needs to prove that the alleged hijackers actually hijacked the planes–a claim that has been questioned by many scholars, notably Elias Davidsson. The first step would be to prove that the named individuals were on the planes via authenticated security videos and passenger lists, ticket stubs, and testimony from airline employees. Oddly, while this evidence should have been put forward the moment the government accused the 19 individuals (i.e. on September 12th, 2001) no such evidence has ever been made public. Additionally, even if the prosecution were able to prove that someone was on an airplane, that is not proof that they hijacked it.  The government clearly needs to prove that all the alleged hijackers were actually on the planes ascribed to them, and actually hijacked the planes.  Since no plane sent out a hijacking code, that is evidence the planes were not hijacked. Media claims about alleged cell phone calls supporting the hijacking story have been cast into doubt by many scientists including A.K. Dewdney, while at least one specific claim–Bush Administration member Ted Olson’s story about getting two calls from his wife describing the hijacking of Flight 77–has been proven false by the FBI, American Airlines, and the Pentagon.
  • To our knowledge, the only direct evidence reported that any specific alleged hijacker actually participated in any alleged hijacking is an alleged recording of Atta’s voice speaking to the passengers on FL11.  But the 9/11 Commission does not say the voice is Atta’s; it only states that the voice is believed to be Atta’s.  We have listened to the voice attributed to Atta, and agree that the speaker’s accent sounds Israeli, not Egyptian. The defense should call a linguist to testify about this.

163. On September 11, 2001, Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Salem al Hazmi hijacked American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, which had departed from Dulles, Virginia, at approximately 8:20 a.m. They crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, at approximately 9:37 a.m., causing the deaths of 59 passengers and crew members on board and 125 persons in the Pentagon. (See Charge Sheet Appendix A for list of individuals killed on Flight 77 and at the Pentagon).

  • [This is where the defense, if given a fair trial, should be able to present expert witness and former Boeing pilot Russ Wittenburg to confirm that Hanjour did not have the skills to fly AA77 in the manner he is alleged to have done.  The government should produce an actual video of FL77 striking the Pentagon with the correct date and time stamp.  There is also Flight Data Recorder evidence that the flight deck door of FL77 was never opened, indicating that the plane was not hijacked.]

164. On September 11, 2001, Ziad Jarrah, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmed al Haznawi hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757, which had departed from Newark, New Jersey, at approximately 8:42 a.m. After resistance by several passengers, Flight 93 crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, at approximately 10:03 a.m., killing all 40 passengers and crew members on board. (See Charge Sheet Appendix A for list of individuals killed on Flight 93).

  • Another problem with this alleged overt act is that passenger Todd Beamer’s reported phone call, according to FBI documents, did not end until 10:49 a.m., 46 minutes after FL93 allegedly crashed, and passenger Jeremy Glick’s reported phone call did not end until 11:43 a.m., 100 minutes after FL93 allegedly crashed.
  • All the other numerous reported phone calls made from FL93 ended on or before 9:58, suggesting that FL93 crashed or was shot down at 9:58, rather than 10:03.]

168. On or about October 7, 2001, in Afghanistan, Usama Bin Laden praised the September 11 attack, and vowed that the United States would not “enjoy security” before “infidel armies leave” the Arabian Peninsula.

  • [This is another completely irrelevant claim, put at the end for media consumption.  Praising an attack is not the same thing as being involved in a conspiracy to perpetrate an attack, and bin Laden is neither a co-defendant nor wanted by the FBI in connection with 9/11.  Even a federal judge is not likely to allow this prejudicial claim into evidence. If the claim is admitted, the defense should point out that Bin Laden is on the record denying involvement in 9/11 on four separate occasions in September 2001, and even deploring the attacks as un-Islamic (David Ray Griffin, Osama Bin Laden: Dead or Alive, p.28).]
  • Mohamed al Kahtani (aliases Ahmed al Qahtani; Mohamed al Qahtani; Abdul Rahman al Janoobi)

5 alleged overt acts: Now we will examine alleged overt acts that actually mention the people who are on trial.

107. On or about July 14, 2001, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Mohamed al Kahtani received a visa to travel to the United States.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.]

118. On or about August 4, 2001, Mohamed al Kahtani traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, via Emirates Flight #7 to London-Gatwick, England, and Virgin Atlantic Flight #15 from London to Orlando, Florida, which was scheduled to arrive at 4:40 p.m.

  • [This is legal, routine, and non-suspicious behavior.]

119. On or about August 4, 2001, Mohamed al Kahtani arrived at Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida, with $2,800 in his possession, and attempted to enter the United States. Al Kahtani also had an itinerary listing the telephone number 0505209905, a phone number associated with Mustafa al Hawsawi.

  • [This is legal behavior.  $2800 cash is not an unusual amount of money for an overseas traveler.  The alleged overt act does not say that al Kahtani knew the number was “associated” with al Hawsawi, nor is the vague term “associated” defined.]

120. On or about August 4, 2001, Mohamed al Kahtani stated to an officer of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service that there was someone “upstairs” in the airport to pick him up. When asked the name of the person, so that the immigration inspector could verify al Kahtani’s intentions in the United States, al Kahtani changed his story and stated that no one was waiting for him.

  • [This, if true, could just be a miscommunication, especially if al Kahtani spoke poor English. How this provides evidence of participation in the crime of the century is not explained.]

122. On or about August 4, 2001, after being told his application for entry into the United States was going to be denied, Mohamed al Kahtani withdrew his application and was placed on board Virgin Atlantic Flight 16, which was scheduled to depart Orlando, Florida, at 8:25 p.m. and traveled back to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, via London, England.

  • [Big deal.  This is astoundingly weak evidence for such a serious charge.  There appears to be no evidence that al Kahtani was involved in any massive conspiracy to kill thousands.  Even if all of the charges against the other defendants were true, it would still be an outrage to put al Kahtani on trail.]
  • Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin ‘Attash (aliases Khallad; Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf; Silver; Tawfiq)

[12 alleged overt acts]

6. In early 1999, Usama bin Laden directed Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin `Attash (a/k/a Khallad, hereinafter Khallad Bin `Attash) to obtain a United States visa so that he could travel to the United States and obtain pilot training in order to participate in what Bin `Attash termed the “Planes Operation.”

  • [Actual evidence needs to provided for this.  If the evidence consists of testimony by a man tortured and then placed in solitary confinement for five years, then that type of evidence is not credible and should not be allowed in front of the jury.  The government also needs to show that “planes operation” was not just an expression used in an innocent manner a couple of times, but rather is actually a conspiracy to commit mass murder.]

7. On or about April 3, 1999, Khallad Bin `Attash traveled to San’a, Yemen and applied for a visa to travel to the United States using the alias “Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf.” This application was denied.

  • [Applying for a visa is hardly evidence of murder. The government needs to prove that “Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf” is really an alias and not a different person.]

9. In or about September 1999, Khallad Bin `Attash administered a forty-five day special course in hand-to-hand combat training at an al Qaeda camp in Logar, Afghanistan, in order to help select trainees for the “Planes Operation.” Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) attended this course. Following their participation in the course, al Mihdhar (AA #77) and al Hazmi (AA #77) were selected to be part of the “Planes Operation.”

  • [Bin Attash has the right to teach martial arts. The government must prove that Bin Attash knowingly trained students to commit mass murder in the US. What evidence could prove that beyond a reasonable doubt, given the years of torture the defendants experienced? Additionally, the government needs to prove that camp was not just some sort of militia group in training.  Militia groups have been common in Afghanistan for hundreds of years, ever since Genghis Khan and the mongol hordes invaded it.  For over 800 years, Afghanistan has been a wild remote area where militia groups have banded together for protection from lawless bandits and corrupt governments.]

10. In or about November 1999, Khallad Bin `Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) traveled from Qandahar, Afghanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, where they moved in with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. With the assistance of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Khallad Bin `Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) began using CDs, books, and other materials to learn about flying airplanes.

  • [Learning about how to fly airplanes is legal and non-suspicious.  This alleged overt act didn’t occur in the United States, raising the legal issue of jurisdiction of U.S. law.]

11. While living in Karachi, Khallad Bin `Attash, and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) used computer simulators to learn how to fly planes, and studied and researched flight timetables for United States air carriers with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in order to coordinate the simultaneous hijacking of multiple aircraft.

  • [A simpler explanation might be that Attash and Hazmi were planning to go on vacation or a business trip into the United States.  The conspiratorial assertion that this was for a hijacking mission must be backed up by credible evidence, not false confessions elicited by breaking the defendant through torture. Torture-broken individuals internalize the instructions of their controllers, meaning that they may continue to repeat and believe false confessions even after the torture has stopped.]

12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was educated in the United States, taught Khallad Bin `Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) various English phrases needed for hijacking planes, including “get down,” “don’t move,” “stay in your seat,” and “if anyone moves I’ll kill you.”

  • [This charge rings false; it sounds like lines fed to a torture victim. An alternative explanation might be that Attash and Hazmi were learning English before their planned vacation or business trip.  More probably they learned hundreds or more words and phrases, and the government may have cherry-picked a few of them.  The cited phrases may also have innocent explanations.  “Get down” might be something learned by a militia man under gunfire.  “Don’t move” and “if anyone moves I’ll kill you” could refer to something said to someone captured by a militia member.  “Stay in your seat” could refer to something said by a militia member stopping someone in a car. Militia membership isn’t illegal…yet.]

15. In or about December 1999, Khallad Bin `Attash traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in order to assess airline security, collect information regarding air carriers for flights in Southeast Asia, and facilitate onward travel for Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) from Kuala Lumpur to the United States.

  • [More likely, Attash went there on vacation or a business trip. We would need to see hard evidence–not torture confessions “made up” by KSM–to be convinced that this trip was part of a criminal operation.]

16. In or about December 1999, before Khallad Bin `Attash departed from Pakistan on his casing trip to Kuala Lumpur, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave him a razor knife to secrete on his person while traveling in order to assess airline security measures. Bin `Attash carried this razor knife on flights to Malaysia, Bangkok, and Hong Kong. On these flights, Bin `Attash collected information on United States air carriers, such as the number of passengers on the flights that were in first class, business class, and economy class.

  • [Is this allegation something KSM “made up”? In any case, it needs to be challenged by the defense.  If Bin `Attash is a member of a military or militia group, why does he need to get a knife from KSM?  He doesn’t already have a knife?  And what is the evidence that a knife was carried on the flights to Malaysia, Bangkok, and Hong Kong?  Since the knife was not found by security, a simpler explanation is that no knife was carried onto the flights.  Or KSM may have just had an old knife he didn’t want and donated it to the militia group.]

17. In or about December 1999, Khallad Bin `Attash devised a scheme in order to assist Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) in traveling to the United States. In order to hide al Hazmi’s previous travel to Pakistan, Bin `Attash directed al Hazmi to purchase two different tickets for travel to Malaysia, one using a fraudulently issued Yemeni passport, which masked his travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan on his valid Saudi passport.

[Here is another conspiratorial word; “scheme”.  Perhaps Hazmi spoke poor English and simply needed help making travel routine travel arrangements.]

18. In or about January 2000, Khallad Bin `Attash briefed Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) regarding Bin `Attash’s surveillance during casing flights, to include the security on the flights, secreting the razor knife onboard the aircraft, and other flight information for use in the “Planes Operation.”

  • [This sounds like a statement made by someone under torture and years of isolation in inhuman solitary confinement.  The government has a knack in conspiracy trials to call routine travel “casing”.]

19. Upon his return, Khallad Bin `Attash prepared a written report and briefed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Mohammed Atef (a/k/a Abu Hafs al Masri, the military commander of al Qaeda) on airline security and Bin `Attash’s ability to get the razor knife on board the flights.

  • [We need to see the alleged report if it really exists and have a reliable translation made into English, along with a full chain of custody including cross-examination of those in the chain.]

61. In or about December 2000, Khallad Bin `Attash provided Hani Hanjour (AA #77) with an email address in order to contact Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) in the United States.

  • [This is legal, if true.  Lots of people forward emails to other people.  Notice that Bin `Attash disappears from the charge sheet long before 9/11 happens.  Bin `Attash seems to be someone who possibly knew or was an acquaintance of KSM.  He may have met a few alleged 9/11 hijackers.  Using these frivolous connections, and torture, the government has constructed a conspiracy theory among a few people who either do not know each other or barely know each other.]

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aliases Ammar al Baluchi; Isam Mansur; Isam Mansar; Isam Mansour; Ali; Hani.)

[21 alleged overt acts]

27. On or about January 3, 2000, Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) and Ali Abdul Aziz Ali ordered the “CityBird” video online and had it shipped to Ali at Post Office Box (P.O. Box 16958), Dubai, United Arab Emirates. After receiving the video, Ali delivered the video to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Pakistan.

  • [It is legal to order a video over the Internet.]

28. On or about January 3, 2000, Marwan Al-Shehhi (UA #175) and Ali Abdul Aziz Ali also purchased 747 flight simulator computer software.

  • [This is legal to do.  Someone with an Arab name sounding similar to Aziz Ali could very well have ordered such a video.]

33. In or about April 2000, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided Ali Abdul Aziz Ali with over $100,000 to be utilized for “operational purposes.”

  • [Paper trail?  Or statement from a man tortured and water-boarded over 100 times?  Incidentally, if KSM has made this claim under torture, and Aziz Ali has contested it, then Aziz Ali should be entitled a separate trial.]

34. In or about April 2000, at the direction of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali spoke over the telephone with Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) (who was in the United States), who requested Ali Abdul Aziz Ali send funds.

  • [The government has to have credible evidence that KSM “directed” Aziz Ali to make a phone call.  It might just be that Aziz Ali can make his own phone calls without being directed by anyone. And asking for money is not a crime.]

35. On or about April 16, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transferred approximately $5000 to Nawaf al Hazmi, through a third party, in San Diego, California.

45. On or about June 29, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (using the alias Isam Mansar) transferred approximately $5,000 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) in New York, New York.

  • [It might just be that Isam Mansar is a different person and is not Aziz Ali. How does this routine money transfer count as evidence of mass murder?]

47. On or about July 18, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (using the alias “Isam Mansur”) transferred approximately $10,000 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to the joint SunTrust Bank account of Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) in Venice, Florida.

  • [Now it is “Mansur”, instead of “Mansar.” While it is true that Arab names can be translated in various ways into English, “Mansur” and “Mansar” represent two very different Arabic names; they cannot possibly be the same Arabic name transliterated in two different ways.]

50. On or about August 5, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (using the alias “Isam Mansour”) transferred approximately $9,500 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to the joint SunTrust Bank account of Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) in Venice, Florida.

  • [Here we have a third spelling of the same name, this time it is “Mansour”.  Perhaps Isam Mansour has trouble with the Latin alphabet.]

53. On or about August 29, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (using the name “Mr. Ali”) transferred approximately $20,000 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to the joint SunTrust Bank account of Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) in Venice, Florida.

  • [There are a lot of people who have the last name “Ali”.  The government may have a paper trail that someone named “Ali” sent $20K to Atta and al-Shehhi.  They need to prove it was Azizi Ali acting with criminal intent.  If they water-boarded, tortured, or put Azizi Alki into solitary confinement to wring a statement from him, that is not credible evidence.]

56. On or about September 17, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (using the alias “Hani (Fawaz TRDNG)”) transferred approximately $70,000 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to the joint SunTrust Bank account of Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) in Venice, Florida.

  • [Here we have a transaction over $10,000, which triggers reporting requirements.  If Aziz Ali were conducting some sort of a stealth operation, he would avoid triggering the reporting threshold.  This alleged transaction also put the total amount of money allegedly sent by Aziz Ali at $119,500, possibly more than was allegedly given to him by KSM.  The government needs to prove they are not fudging the numbers.]

63. On or about December 5, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali helped Hani Hanjour (AA #77) open a banking account at the Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Citibank (hereinafter Hanjour Citibank account), and provided approximately $3,000 to Hanjour to deposit in the account.

  • [This is legal to do.]

64. In or about December 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali reserved a plane ticket for Hani Hanjour (AA #77) to travel to the United States to join the other operatives already there.

  • [The government calls these people “operatives”, but they must prove they are not simply tourists or businessmen.]

66. Upon Hani Hanjour’s (AA #77) arrival in San Diego, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) contacted Ali Abdul Aziz Ali to advise him that Hanjour had arrived safely.

  • [This isn’t even an alleged overt act by Aziz Ali.  Ali didn’t do anything.]

68. On or about December 26, 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan, and returned to Dubai on or about January 5, 2001.

  • [This is legal.  It is not suspicious.]

69. On or about January 28, 2001, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali deposited $5,000 in Hani Hanjour’s (AA #77) Citibank account.

  • [Was the deposit in cash?  It there is a paper trail?  The government should know.]

85. On or about May 26, 2001, Mohand al Shehri (UA #93), Ahmed al Nami (UA #93), and Hamza al Ghamdi (UA #175) purchased plane tickets to travel from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Miami, Florida via London, UK. They all listed 050 7696327 as their contact number, a phone number associated with Ali Abdul Aziz Ali.

  • [“Associated” is a vague term.  It means nothing legally, unless it is defined.]

88. On or about June 6, 2001, Ahmad al Haznawi (UA #93) and Wail al Shehri (AA #11) purchased plane tickets to travel from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Miami, Florida via London, England. They both listed 050 7696327 as their contact number, a phone number associated with Ali Abdul Aziz Ali.

  • [Here it is again, the word “associated”.   This is an attempt at guilt by association.]

97. While the non-pilot hijackers were in Dubai, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa al Hawsawi assisted them by purchasing clothing, food, lodging, rental cars, traveler’s checks, and making travel arrangements.

  • [Here the government uses the loaded term “non-pilot hijackers”.  Which ones?  The government is trying to link Aziz Ali to most of the other alleged hijackers with a vague, non-specific comment, in order to make their giant conspiracy theory seem plausible.  In reality, only a few of the alleged hijackers are named in conjunction with Aziz Ali.]

99. On or about June 26, 2001, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. Between, on, or about June 27, 2001, and on or about July 14, 2001, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali met with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and advised Mohammed that Ali was willing to do anything to help the mission (referring to the “Planes Operation”) which, based on past conversations between Ali and Mohammed, included being a martyr. Mohammed advised Ali to apply for a United States visa to travel to the United States.

  • [This one is a mouthful.  The government needs to provide actual credible evidence that Aziz Ali really wanted to become an actual martyr.  Since Aziz Ali did not become a martyr, that is evidence that he didn’t want to become one.]

139. On or about August 28, 2001, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali applied for a visa to travel to the United States on September 4, 2001, for a period of one week. This application was denied.

  • [Applying for a visa is a common, legal activity.  It is a real stretch to consider it an overt act.]

153. On or about September 10, 2001, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan.

  • [Big deal.  The main argument by the government for Aziz Ali is that he allegedly got money from KSM, and then sent money to a few of the alleged hijackers.  If either of these allegations is not proven, the entire government conspiracy theory mostly crumbles into dust.]

I Ramzi Binalshibh (aliases Abu Ubaydah; Ahad Abdollahi Sabet; Abu Ubaydah al Hadrami)

[22 alleged overt acts]

20. Between November 1999 and February 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) traveled from Hamburg, Germany, to Qandahar, Afghanistan to attend an al Qaeda training camp.

  • [Or a militia camp; an “al Qaeda training camp” needs a legal definition.  The government is probably just bringing in the words “al Qaeda” to prejudice the jury.]

21. In or about January 2000, Usama bin Laden chose Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) to participate in the “Planes Operation” in the United States.

22. In or about January 2000, Usama bin Laden and Mohammed Atef tasked Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) to obtain flight training for a martyrdom operation and report to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on their progress.

  • [It is more probable that some of the people named in this charge sheet simply took a few flight training classes.  Evidence needs to be produced that proves that Binalshibh can actually be ordered around.]

23. In or about January 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed Atta (AA #11), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) filmed videos to serve as their “martyr wills” in anticipation of dying in an attack against the United States.

  • [These videos have been made public.  Interesting that the alleged “wills” are silent. Can they be proved genuine?]

24. In or about January 2000, Mohammed Atef sent Ramzi Binalshibh and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) to Karachi, Pakistan, to meet with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for the first time to discuss future communication protocols between Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the hijackers.

  • [This alleged overt act has a vague time reference.  The government needs to prove that people being tortured or left in solitary confinement at Gitmo did not invent details.  If testimony has been extracted by KSM against Binalshibh, then Binalshibh should be entitled a separate trial.]

30. In or about March 2000, upon returning to Hamburg, Germany, Ramzi Binalshibh and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) researched flight schools via the internet in support of the “Planes Operation.”

  • [The government has probably just added conspiratorial spin to a routine legal action.  Research on the Internet is legal.  The government has already claimed in item # 31 above that Atta, and probably Binalshibh, sought careers as airplane pilots.]

36. On or about May 17, 2000, in Berlin, Germany, Ramzi Binalshibh applied for a visa to travel to the United States, which was denied.

  • [Visa applications are not illegal.]

41. On or about June 13, 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh sent a Moneygram wire transfer from Hamburg, Germany, in the amount of 5,789.26 German Deutschmarks (U.S. $2,708.33) to Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) in New York, New York.

  • [The government needs to prove that the actual defendant on trial did this, and not someone else with the same name.  Even if the defendant did, all it proves is that Binalshibh has a business or personal relationship with al Shehhi.  It does not prove a conspiracy.]

42. On or about June 15, 2000, in Berlin, Germany, Ramzi Binalshibh applied for the second time for a visa to travel to the United States, which was denied.

  • [This is called puffing.  The next thing you will know, the government will claim, “Binalshibh breathed in oxygen”, and call that an overt act.]

43. On or about June 21, 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh sent a Moneygram wire transfer from Hamburg, Germany, in the amount of 3,862.76 German Deutschmarks (U.S. $1,803.19) to Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) in New York, New York.

  • [We already have an allegation like this; it adds nothing to the government case.]

49. On or about July 26, 2000, in Germany, Ramzi Binalshibh wired 3,853 Deutschmarks (U.S. $1,760.61) from Hamburg, Germany, to Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) in Sarasota, Florida.

  • [The government wants us to believe that wiring money is highly suspicious.  In reality, most people who wire money are honest folk.  If the transaction were intended to be part of some covert conspiracy, there is no evidence presented here that this transaction was concealed in any manner.]

51. In or about August 2000, Ziad Jarrah (UA #93), while attending flight training at Florida Flight Training Center, assisted Ramzi Binalshibh in his attempt to enroll in flight training with him.

  • [It is not specified what kind of assistance is alleged here.  It is not illegal to help someone enroll in flight school.]

52. On or about August 14, 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh wired 4,739.32 German Deutschmarks (approximately U.S. $2,200) from his account in Germany to the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC).

  • [Well, if someone enrolled in a flight school, they probably have to pay for it.]

54. Beginning in September 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh attempted to enroll in the Aviation Language School in Miami, Florida.

  • [Again, this is another legal and non-suspicious action, which the government has listed as an overt act.]

55. On or about September 15, 2000, in San’a, Yemen, Ramzi Binalshibh applied for a visa for a third time to travel to the United States, which was denied.

  • [We repeat: it is not illegal to apply for a visa.]

57. On or about September 25, 2000, Ramzi Binalshibh wired $4,118.13 from Hamburg, Germany, to Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) in Nokomis, Florida, via Western Union.

  • [A lot of Arab names are confusing and have similar spellings.  The government needs actual evidence that the defendant did this with intent to commit mass murder.]

58. On or about October 25, 2000, in Berlin, Germany, Ramzi Binalshibh applied for a fourth and final time for a visa to travel to the United States, which was denied.

  • [For the fourth and final time, it is not illegal to apply for a visa.]

59. When Ramzi Binalshibh was unable to obtain a visa to travel to the United States, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed named Binalshibh as his main assistant in the “Planes Operation” due to his knowledge of the details of the plot. Mohamed Atta (AA #11) was selected as the “emir” of the group and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) was selected as Atta’s “deputy.” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave Mohamed Atta (AA #11) full authority to make operational decisions in the United States.

  • [I’d like to see what evidence is produced for this allegation.  Were business cards printed up that said “Emir Atta” and “Deputy Hazmi”?]

70. In or about late January 2001, Ramzi Binalshibh traveled from Germany to Afghanistan to notify Usama bin Laden, Abu Hafs al Masri, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) had completed their initial flight training in the United States.

  • [In other alleged overt acts, the targets of the government can send messages or emails to each other.  Now, in this allegation, Binalshibh must travel all the way from Germany to Afghanistan just to deliver a simple message.]

128. On or about late August 2001, Ramzi Binalshibh sent a message to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed notifying him that Mohamed Atta (AA #11) had chosen September 11, 2001, as the date of the operation. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad reported the date to Usama bin Laden, who began preparing al Qaeda members and their families in Afghanistan in anticipation of the expected United States military response. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed traveled from Afghanistan to Pakistan shortly after having been notified.

145. On or about September 3, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi, using the alias Hashem Abdollahi, and listing the contact phone number 050 7692590, sent $1,500 to Ahad Abdollahi Sabet, an alias for Ramzi Binalshibh.

  • [These “aliases” may very well be different people.  If the government tortured prisoners at Gitmo to get them to “admit” to an alias, that will not cut it for reliable evidence.]

167. In late September 2001, Usama bin Laden, Ramzi Binalshibh, Mustafa al Hawsawi and other members of al Qaeda met near Kabul, Afghanistan, to discuss the September 11 operation; this meeting was videotaped and later released by al Qaeda for propaganda purposes.

  • [Another explanation might be that the government targeted some people for conspiracy charges because they met and talked about 9/11 after it happened.  Binalshibh may be an individual who had a loose acquaintance with a few of the other defendants or alleged hijackers.  He may have tried to get a US visa.  Such bad luck got him targeted in a giant conspiracy theory. With regards to what bin Laden was saying about 9/11 in September 2001, he is on the record denying involvement four separate times, on September 12th, 16th, 17th, and 28th, and even deploring the attacks as un-Islamic (Griffin, Osama bin Laden: Dead or Alive? p.28).]

Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi (aliases Zahir; HaShem Abdollahi; Muhammad Ahanad; Abderahman Mustafa)

[30 alleged overt acts]

75. In or about April 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from Karachi, Pakistan, at the direction of al Qaeda’s Media Committee.

  • [This is a good one.  The government says al Qaeda has a Media Committee.  Does this Media Committee have a website?  Who is their webmaster?  Who does their TV and radio interviews?  Who writes their press releases?  What media experience do the members have? Why hasn’t the CIA done a whois.net lookup? We will need to see evidence showing precisely what this “media committee” is, along with hard evidence of its orders to al Hawsawi,  before we could believe that al Hawsawi was acting under its direction.]

91. On or about June 23, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi opened a bank account at the Standard Chartered Bank in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, and obtained an ATM card in connection with the checking account.

  • [Horrors! A bank account with an ATM card!]

92. On or about June 24, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi opened P.O. Box #19738 in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.

  • [Proof needed for this. And proof needed of its relevance.]

93. On or about June 25, 2001, Fayez Banihammad (UA #175), accompanied by Mustafa al Hawsawi, opened a current account, fixed deposit account, and VISA card account at the same Standard Chartered Bank branch used by al Hawsawi two days earlier. Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) provided al Hawsawi with a letter to grant him the authority to pick up Banihammad’s ATM and credit card.

  • [So at most, these two people may know each other and/or have some sort of business or personal relationship.]

94. On or about June 25, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi opened a fixed deposit account and applied for a VISA card at the Standard Chartered Bank in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.

  • [This adds nothing to the government conspiracy theory, and it didn’t happen in the United States.]

95. On or about June 25, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi purchased plane tickets for Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) and Saeed al Ghamdi (UA #93) to travel from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Orlando, Florida, via London, England. They both listed 0505209905 as their contact number, a phone number associated with Mustafa al Hawsawi.

  • [“Associated” is a vague term.  The government claims Hawsawi purchased the tickets, but that could just be the government theory, based on the alleged association with the phone number.]

97. While the non-pilot hijackers were in Dubai, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa al Hawsawi assisted them by purchasing clothing, food, lodging, rental cars, traveler’s checks, and making travel arrangements.

  • [Everybody needs clothing, food, and lodging.  This is yet another non-suspicious alleged overt act.]

98. Each hijacker was given between $6,000 and $10,000 in cash by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or Mustafa al Hawsawi with instructions to keep a few thousand dollars for themselves and to give the remaining money to Mohamed Atta (AA #11) for operational expenses.

  • [There is very likely no paper trail for this or any actual evidence to support it. Another story KSM “made up” under torture?]

100. On or about June 28, 2001, Abdul Aziz al Omari (AA #11) and Salem al Hazmi (AA #77) purchased plane tickets to travel from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to New York, New York, via Zurich, Switzerland. They both listed 050 5209905 as their contact number, a phone number associated with Mustafa al Hawsawi.

  • [Here again, the guilt by association technique is used.  The alleged association to the phone number must be clarified and defined.]

110. On or about July 18, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi took power of attorney over Fayez Banihammad’s (UA #175) Standard Chartered Bank accounts in the United Arab Emirates.

  • [This sounds like it might be one of the few alleged overt acts claimed by the government that might be true.  If true, it proves nothing.]

111. On or about July 18, 2001, using his power of attorney, Mustafa al Hawsawi picked up Fayez Banihammad’s (UA #175) VISA and ATM cards from Standard Chartered Bank in the United Arab Emirates.

  • [This is totally legal.  Why it was allegedly done, is not explained.]

112. On or about July 23, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi withdrew 500 Dirhams (U.S. $136.24) from an ATM in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, from the Standard Chartered Bank account of Fayez Banihammad (UA #175).

  • [Wow!  136 dollars and 24 cents?  That’s a lot of cake!]

113. On or about July 23, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi sent a package using the alias “Hashim,” to Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) in Delray Beach, Florida, listing the mobile phone number 5209905 and P.O. Box #19738, SHJ, United Arab Emirates.

  • [“Hashim” and Hawsawi could be two different people.  The burden of proof is on the government.]

119. On or about August 4, 2001, Mohamed al Kahtani arrived at Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida, with $2,800 in his possession, and attempted to enter the United States. Al Kahtani also had an itinerary listing the telephone number 0505209905, a phone number associated with Mustafa al Hawsawi.

  • [Since Kahtani was in the United Stated, and Hawsawi was in the U.A.E., saying that Hawsawi was on Kahtani’s itinerary makes little sense.]

121. On or about August 4, 2001, in between 4:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., a total of five phone calls were placed using a calling card associated with Mohamed Atta (AA #11) from a pay telephone in Orlando International Airport to telephone number 971-50-520-9905, a phone number associated with Mustafa al Hawsawi.

  • [This overt act does not say Atta made the calls, and does not even claim the calling card was Atta’s.  In other words, it alleges nothing.]

129. On or about August 25, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi applied for a supplemental Standard Chartered Bank VISA card in the name of Abdul Rahman Abdullah al Ghamdi, and attached a photograph of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the supplemental applicant.

  • [It is unclear how this alleged overt act furthered the alleged conspiracy.]

145. On or about September 3, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi, using the alias Hashem Abdollahi, and listing the contact phone number 050 7692590, sent $1,500 to Ahad Abdollahi Sabet, an alias for Ramzi Binalshibh.

  • [This doesn’t further the alleged conspiracy.]

146. On or about September 4, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) sent a Federal Express package containing Fayez Banihammad’s (UA #175) ATM card and a blank check to Mustafa al Hawsawi’s Post Office Box (#19738) in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. Mustafa al Hawsawi collected the package on or about September 8, 2001.

  • [It is not illegal to send or collect a package.  The government does not seem to know what is in the package, so the government has no way of knowing whether this is a relevant allegation to present to the jury.]

147. On or about September 5, 2001, Fayez Banihammad (UA #175) wired approximately $8,000 from his Florida SunTrust account to the Standard Chartered Bank account, over which Mustafa al Hawsawi had power of attorney.

  • [This is a legal action.  If Hawsawi had power of attorney, it might explain why the cash was wired.]

148. On or about September 8, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) wired $2,860 to “Mustafa Ahmed” in the United Arab Emirates. Mustafa al Hawsawi obtained the funds, using a true name photo identification, at the Wall Street Exchange, Dubai, United Arab Emirates on or about September 9, 2001.

  • [So Mustafa Ahmed picked up the money using his real ID, or Hawsawi did?]

149. On or about September 8, 2001, Mohamed Atta (AA #11) wired an additional $5,000 to “Mustafa Ahmed” in United Arab Emirates. The funds were received by Mustafa al Hawsawi, using a true name photo identification, at the Wall Street Exchange, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on or about September 10, 2001.

  • [This action does not further the alleged conspiracy and is not illegal.]

150. On or about September 9, 2001, Waleed al Shehri (AA #11) wired $5,000 to “Ahanad Mustafa” in the United Arab Emirates. The funds were received by Mustafa al Hawsawi, using a true name photo identification, at the Al-Ansari Exchange, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, on or about September 11, 2001.

  • [We could have name confusion here.  Waleed al Shehri is one of the alleged hijackers reported alive after 9/11.  The confusion needs to be cleared up.]

151. On or about September 10, 2001, Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) wired $5,400 to “Mustafa Ahmad” in United Arab Emirates. Mustafa al Hawsawi collected the funds using a true name photo identification, at the Al-Ansari Exchange, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, on or about September 11, 2001.

  • [This is a confusing repeat of # 148 above.]

152. On or about September 10, 2001, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77), using the alias “Rawf Al-Dog,” attempted to send a package to Mustafa al Hawsawi’s P.O. Box #19738, Al Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, containing a First Union VISA check card in the name of Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) and other account information.

  • [This is legal and does not further the alleged conspiracy.  The government needs to prove that ‘Rawf al-Dog” is really an alias and not just a different person who may resemble al Hazmi.  If we knew what was in the package, it might disprove the government conspiracy theory.]

154. On or about September 11, 2001, in United Arab Emirates, Mustafa al Hawsawi deposited approximately 60,000 Dirhams (U.S. $16,348) into his Standard Chartered Bank account.

  • [What kind of deposit; cash or check?  If there is a real paper trail, that would be known information.]

155. On September 11, 2001, prior to the hijackings taking place in the United States, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Mustafa al Hawsawi transferred approximately 24,000 Dirhams (U.S. $6,534) from Fayez Banihammad’s (UA #175) Standard Chartered Bank account into his own account, using a check dated September 10, 2001, and signed by Fayez Banihammad (UA #175). Mustafa al Hawsawi then withdrew approximately 5000 Dirhams (U.S. $1,361), nearly all the remaining balance in Banihammad’s (UA #175) account, by ATM cash withdrawal.

  • [Hawsawi and Banihammad may have had a business relationship and were conducting business.]

156. On or about September 11, 2001, in United Arab Emirates, Mustafa al Hawsawi prepaid approximately 150,000 Dirhams (U.S. $40,871) to a VISA card connected to his Standard Chartered Bank account.

  • [Such transactions are common in Dubai.]

157. On or about September 11, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan.

  • [Legal and commonplace.]

166. On or about September 13, 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed used the supplemental VISA card connected to Mustafa al Hawsawi’s Standard Chartered Bank VISA account to make six ATM withdrawals in Karachi, Pakistan.

  • [“Connected to” is vague and means nothing, unless defined more precisely.]

167. In late September 2001, Usama bin Laden, Ramzi Binalshibh, Mustafa al Hawsawi and other members of al Qaeda met near Kabul, Afghanistan, to discuss the September 11 operation; this meeting was videotaped and later released by al Qaeda for propaganda purposes.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (aliases Mukhtar al Baluchi; Hafiz; Meer Akram; Abdul Rahman Abdullah AI Ghamdi)

[30 alleged overt acts]

2. In 1996, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed met with Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan and discussed the operational concept of hijacking commercial airliners and crashing them into buildings in the United States and elsewhere. This plan was ultimately approved by Usama bin Laden.

3. Between 1996 and 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Usama bin Laden, and Mohammed Atef (a/k/a Abu Hafs al Masri, the military commander of al Qaeda), proposed and discussed potential targets for attack by hijacked commercial airliners and decided to target economic, political, and military buildings in the United States and Western Pacific.

  • [Pretty hard to establish an alibi when the time frame is five years long, which is one reason the feds like conspiracy charges.]

10. In or about November 1999, Khallad Bin `Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) traveled from Qandahar, Afghanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, where they moved in with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. With the assistance of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Khallad Bin `Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) began using CDs, books, and other materials to learn about flying airplanes.

  • [They traveled, lived together, read books, and listened to CDs.]

11. While living in Karachi, Khallad Bin `Attash, and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) used computer simulators to learn how to fly planes, and studied and researched flight timetables for United States air carriers with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in order to coordinate the simultaneous hijacking of multiple aircraft.

  • [The feds keep putting a conspiratorial spin on ordinary activities. Many pilots and would-be pilots use flight simulators. People planning trips research flight timetables. For example: Did these allegedly fanatical Muslims “research flight timetables” for their boozy, drug-fueled junkets to Las Vegas in search of lap dances? Is it conceivable that any Muslim–much less a fanatic–would behave this way shortly before a martyrdom operation?]

12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was educated in the United States, taught Khallad Bin `Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) various English phrases needed for hijacking planes, including “get down,” “don’t move,” “stay in your seat,” and “if anyone moves I’ll kill you.”

  • [These could be lines from famous Hollywood movies.  It is legal to learn English, and a good idea to do if you are going to visit the United States. More pertinently, where could this alleged evidence have come from other than the torture sessions during which KSM “made up stories“?]

13. In or about 1999, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed requested and received funding for his idea of hijacking planes and crashing them into buildings from Usama bin Laden (hereinafter the “Planes Operation”).

  • [The government has to prove there actually was a “planes operation”.  This alleged overt act does not prove it.]

14. In or about November 1999, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) with funds in order to travel to the United States to train and prepare for the “Planes Operation.”

  • [How much funds and in what form?  There is likely no paper trail for this. How do we know KSM didn’t make this up under torture?]

16. In or about December 1999, before Khallad Bin `Attash departed from Pakistan on his casing trip to Kuala Lumpur, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave him a razor knife to secrete on his person while traveling in order to assess airline security measures. Bin `Attash carried this razor knife on flights to Malaysia, Bangkok, and Hong Kong. On these flights, Bin `Attash collected information on United States air carriers, such as the number of passengers on the flights that were in first class, business class, and economy class.

  • [This claim, like virtually all of the others, could be based on a false confession by someone who has been tortured or water-boarded at Gitmo.]

22. In or about January 2000, Usama bin Laden and Mohammed Atef tasked Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) to obtain flight training for a martyrdom operation and report to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on their progress.

  • [The government has to prove there really was a martyrdom operation.  This alleged overt act does not prove it.]

24. In or about January 2000, Mohammed Atef sent Ramzi Binalshibh and Mohamed Atta (AA #11) to Karachi, Pakistan, to meet with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for the first time to discuss future communication protocols between Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the hijackers.

  • [If Atef is a government snitch in the case, he can be cross-examined by the defense to assess his credibility.]

25. As part of the operational security for the “Planes Operation,” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed instructed both Mohamed Atta (AA #11) and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) to meet in places in the United States where tourists frequent so they would not stand out.

  • [They could also simply meet indoors at their own place of residence.  Of course, from reading the charge sheet, we have no idea where these people lived. More “stories” made up under torture?]

26. In or about January 2000, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told Ali Abdul Aziz Ali that “Marwan” (identified by Ali as Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175)) would be traveling to meet Ali in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed directed Ali and al Shehhi (UA#175) to use the internet to order a video entitled “CityBird,” depicting cockpit operations in a Boeing 767-300 while flying throughout the world.

27. On or about January 3, 2000, Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175) and Ali Abdul Aziz Ali ordered the “CityBird” video online and had it shipped to Ali at Post Office Box (P.O. Box 16958), Dubai, United Arab Emirates. After receiving the video, Ali delivered the video to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Pakistan.

  • [The government seems to be attributing supernatural powers to the “CityBird” video (see above).]

29. On or about January 15, 2000, Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77), the first two hijackers to reach the United States, traveled from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles, California, on United Airlines Flight # 2, with orders from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to undergo flight training, learn English, and affiliate with a mosque to help them assimilate in the United States.

  • [If al Mihdar and al Hazmi are really practicing Muslims, they don’t need to be ordered to attend a mosque.  Hence, this item, if true, is further evidence that al Mihdar and al Hazmi, like the other alleged hijackers, are NOT practicing Muslims. (But why would boozing, cocaine-snorting, lapdance-loving pork chop fanciers expect to achieve martyrdom?)]

33. In or about April 2000, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided Ali Abdul Aziz Ali with over $100,000 to be utilized for “operational purposes.”

  • [How much more than $100,000?  The amount is vague, implying the evidence for this is scanty.]

34. In or about April 2000, at the direction of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali spoke over the telephone with Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) (who was in the United States), who requested Ali Abdul Aziz Ali send funds.

  • [Asking for money is legal and a lot of people do it.]

59. When Ramzi Binalshibh was unable to obtain a visa to travel to the United States, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed named Binalshibh as his main assistant in the “Planes Operation” due to his knowledge of the details of the plot. Mohamed Atta (AA #11) was selected as the “emir” of the group and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) was selected as Atta’s “deputy.” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave Mohamed Atta (AA #11) full authority to make operational decisions in the United States.

  • [Binalshibh practically disappears from the charge sheet after he is named the main assistant.  Based on the charge sheet, he doesn’t really seem to know that much about the alleged plot, either.  And the government needs good evidence that Atta really had a the title of “emir”.]

70. In or about late January 2001, Ramzi Binalshibh traveled from Germany to Afghanistan to notify Usama bin Laden, Abu Hafs al Masri, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that Mohamed Atta (AA #11), Marwan al Shehhi (UA #175), and Ziad Jarrah (UA #93) had completed their initial flight training in the United States.

  • [If Masri, is a government snitch, then he can be called to the witness stand.]

76. Between in or about September 2000 and in or about July 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed instructed the non-pilot hijackers to travel to their home countries to obtain “clean” passports (a passport not reflecting travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan), visas from other Western countries, and visas to the United States, then return to Pakistan. Following the hijackers’ return to Pakistan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed sent them to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to await final travel to the United States. On several occasions, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided the non-pilot hijackers with chemicals in an eye dropper to remove any Pakistani stamps from their passports.

  • [After eight years of scrutiny, this seems to be the best alleged evidence the government could find of any moderately and/or borderline criminal behavior by anyone involved in the alleged plot.  What is more telling is the lack of previous criminal offenses for the defendants.  What the government is telling us is that the entire alleged 9/11 plot was pulled off by first-time offenders.]

77. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed personally trained the hijackers and informed them that they were going on a martyrdom operation involving airplanes, but at the time of their training they were not made aware of the specific targets.

  • [What kind of training is alleged?  What’s the evidence?  Made-up torture stories? So did the alleged hijackers learn to fly planes from KSM or at flight school?  This alleged overt act doesn’t even tell us when it allegedly happened.  More likely, the alleged hijackers never heard of any martyrdom operation, a supposition which explains their wildly un-Islamic behavior.]

78. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and others trained the non-pilot hijackers by providing instructions on how to pack their bags to best secrete knives onto a plane, and on how to slit passengers’ throats by making the hijackers practice on sheep, goats, and camels in preparation for the “Planes Operation.”

  • [Did KSM make up this story himself during a torture session, or was it suggested to him by his tormentors?]

79. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed directed al Qaeda to film martyr videos of some of the hijackers, several of which were released publicly through al Qaeda’s media wing, As Sahab Productions.

  • [If the martyr videos were actually released, then the jury gets to see them, and so should the American public.  The videos must contain an accurate translation into English of all spoken Arabic in the film. Independent experts, not US intelligence agencies with a track record of “authenticating” phony “al Qaeda” videos, should investigate whether the videos are genuine. Proof that KSM ordered the production of the videos–not stories made up under torture–must be offered if this overt act is to have any relevance.]

80. From on or about April 19, 2001, until on or about August 4, 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ordered that the non-pilot hijackers be sent to the United States and gave the hijackers operational guidance on how to avoid detection during their travel to the United States.

  • [What kind of operational guidance to avoid detection the feds are talking about is unclear from this vague claim.  So far, everything the alleged hijackers were doing has been legal.]

98. Each hijacker was given between $6,000 and $10,000 in cash by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or Mustafa al Hawsawi with instructions to keep a few thousand dollars for themselves and to give the remaining money to Mohamed Atta (AA #11) for operational expenses.

  • [Evidence please.]

99. On or about June 26, 2001, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. Between, on, or about June 27, 2001, and on or about July 14, 2001, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali met with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and advised Mohammed that Ali was willing to do anything to help the mission (referring to the “Planes Operation”) which, based on past conversations between Ali and Mohammed, included being a martyr. Mohammed advised Ali to apply for a United States visa to travel to the United States.

  • [Ali here is being portrayed as a real eager beaver.  Basically, the government is assuming to the jury what they have to prove. If false-confessions from torture are the “proof,” that doesn’t cut it.]

128. On or about late August 2001, Ramzi Binalshibh sent a message to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed notifying him that Mohamed Atta (AA #11) had chosen September 11, 2001, as the date of the operation. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad reported the date to Usama bin Laden, who began preparing al Qaeda members and their families in Afghanistan in anticipation of the expected United States military response. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed traveled from Afghanistan to Pakistan shortly after having been notified.

  • [Again, if this is true, why hasn’t bin Laden been charged? Additionally, we need some hard evidence that Atta actually chose the date.  He was reportedly seen on gambling boats about one week prior to 9/11, perhaps he decided the date while at the craps table? Was it also Atta who chose September 11th, 2001 as the biggest National Security Special Event Day in US history, featuring a long list of war games and terror exercises which mirrored the plane-into-buildings scenario, envisioned mass casualties in New York, disarmed the F-16s at Andrews Air Force Base and sent them away from Washington D.C., and otherwise facilitated the attacks? While there have been several media reports of more than one Mohammed Atta, including the original Egyptian Atta as well as a second who, according to girlfriend Amanda Keller, spoke fluent Hebrew (which would explain why “Atta’s voice” has an Israeli accent), it seems unlikely that yet another Atta was in charge of scheduling National Security Special Event Days.  The government must prove that the exact same Mohammed Atta, who supposedly chose September 11, is the same Mohammed Atta who may have been in contact with some defendants in this trial.  The government must also show that Atta choosing a certain date for travel is the same thing as choosing a certain date for mass murder.]

129. On or about August 25, 2001, Mustafa al Hawsawi applied for a supplemental Standard Chartered Bank VISA card in the name of Abdul Rahman Abdullah al Ghamdi, and attached a photograph of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the supplemental applicant.

  • [This is one of the most specific “allegations” among those attributed to KSM.  Notably, the alleged overt act is perfectly legal.]

165. Between on or about September 11, 2001, and on or about September 21, 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and others in his Karachi, Pakistan, guesthouse recorded many news stories of the attacks for future use in propaganda films.

  • [They might have just recorded the news stories because it was a sensational news event.  Many people made recordings from their TVs on 9/11.]

166. On or about September 13, 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed used the supplemental VISA card connected to Mustafa al Hawsawi’s Standard Chartered Bank VISA account to make six ATM withdrawals in Karachi, Pakistan.

  • [This is legal to do, and the alleged conspiracy is already over by this time.]

169. On or about late 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed attended a meeting with Usama bin Laden when Usama bin Laden confirmed al Qaeda’s involvement in the September 11, 2001, plot in a videotaped message.

  • [The defense should be able to call an expert witness, like Dr. Bruce Lawrence of Duke University, who is a bin Laden expert, to testify about the contents of the video.]

Conclusion

Of the 30 alleged overt acts attributed to KSM, only a few even claim an action that is illegal.  Overall, only 100 of the alleged overt acts are attributed to the defendants on trial.  Only 20 of the alleged overt acts have two defendants working together in the conspiracy.  Not a single alleged overt act has three or more defendants working together in the same overt act.  Even if the alleged 9/11 hijackers really hijacked the planes–an allegation for which there appears to be no evidence–the entire case against KSM is very weak.  Once evidence gained from torture is removed, there will be no relevant evidence left.  If KSM and his co-defendants put on a reasonably good defense, and receive a fair and impartial jury, they will easily win the trial.  Unfortunately, it has been reported that five of the defendants will plead guilty.  They have been broken by years of torture and other subhuman treatment at Gitmo.  Like others broken by torture, they may have internalized whatever the torturers told them. Oddly, the one defendant that has no evidence against him whatsoever, Kahtani, is the only one not coming to New York for his trial.

Rolf Lindgren (photo here) holds a BA in Mathematics. He is a member of the Libertarian Party and former Vice-Chair of the LP of Wisconsin.  He has extensive experience dealing with the federal criminal “justice” system. He is a 9/11 researcher since 2006, when he first met Dr. Kevin Barrett.  He has a bachelor’s degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  He works as a Loan Officer and lives in Middleton, Wisconsin.  Rolf is a defender of Galileo and James Madison.

Dr. Kevin Barrett is the author of three books including the brand-new Questioning the War on Terror: A Primer for Obama Voters, which deconstructs the “war on terror” through Socratic questioning. A Ph.D. Arabist-Islamologist, he has taught languages, literature, humanities, religious studies, and folklore at colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad. Dr. Barrett ran for Congress in 2008. His website, which links his radio shows, is TruthJihad.com.

We would also like to thank Dr. James H. Fetzer, Michael Brick, Andrew Kornkven, and Bruce Rideout for assistance with this article.
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1 Comment

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